Yerdaddy
01-23-2004, 04:08 PM
Whatever else happens, this is one aspect of our involvement in Iraq that won't be going away any time soon.
<a href="http://www.petermaass.com/core.cfm?p=1&mag=120&magtype=1" target="_blank">The Counterinsurgent</a>
A good article about the nature of the current insurgency in Iraq, from the viewpoint of Maj. John Nagl, West Point grad, PhD, counterinsurgency expert, professor at West Point, and now based near Falluja, in the "Sunni Triangle."
Article by Nagl referenced in previous article:
<a href="http://www.findarticles.com/cf_0/m2393/4_161/54146668/print.jhtml" target="_blank">Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife(1).(military policy)
World Affairs, Spring, 1999, by John A. Nagl
BRITISH AND AMERICAN ARMY COUNTERINSURGENCY LEARNING DURING THE MALAYAN EMERGENCY AND THE VIETNAM WAR</a>
<a href="http://www.twq.com/04winter/index.cfm?id=83" target="_blank">Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in Iraq - Steven Metz, director of research at the U.S. Army War College's Strategic Studies Institute.</a>
The intro:
[quote]An insurgency is born long before the government it seeks to overthrow knows of its existence. Rebels, guerrillas, and terrorists, far from prying eyes, gather in dark buildings, foreign sanctuaries, or-in today's day and age-online. At least initially, survival depends on cloaking intent and strength with ambiguity, deception, and subterfuge. Even after attacks begin in earnest, the intended targets tend to underestimate the problem, believ-ing it to be controllable, unorganized, and isolated rather than a symptom of a deeper pathology.
Understanding the factors leading to such a miscalculation is easy. Gone are the Cold War days when regimes could rely on a superpower patron for increased support against a rebellion. Although the most benevolent and stable government may face isolated violence, an organized insurgency reveals deep flaws in rule or administration. Today, even an unsuccessful insurrection can weaken or undercut a government, hinder economic development and access to global capital, or at least force national leaders to alter key policies. The tendency then is to deny or underestimate the threat, to believe that killing or capturing only a few of the most obvious rebel leaders will solve the problem when in fact the problem-the heart of the insurgency- lies deeper.
Like cancers, insurgencies are seldom accorded the seriousness they deserve at precisely the time they are most vulnerable, early in their development. Such is the situation that the United States and coalition forces face in Iraq today. Although U.S. strategists and political leaders may disagree about who is behind the violence in Iraq, the preconditions for a serious and sustained insurgency clearly exist.
The stakes in Iraq are immense. The conflict there will help determine whether the world continues its difficult and uneven movement toward a global system based on open governments and economies or fractures into a new bipolarity. The Arab world is the region most resistant to the U.S. vision of open economies and governments. If it can work there, it can work anywhere. Iraq is the beachhead, the test case, the laboratory.
Given these stakes and the price already paid, the United States must continue to pursue its strategic objective in Iraq but must do so in a way that limits the long-term damage to the United States itself and to the fragile, new Iraqi society. Calls for a speedy U.S. withdrawal will increase as the conflict drags on. Even Ambassador Paul Bremer, head of the Coalition Provisional Authority, has hinted that the United States may leave Iraq by the summer of 2004. Leaving too soon, however, would be disastrous. After all, Osama bin Laden's rise was in part a result of abandoning Afghanistan too soon after foreign occupation in 1979. Departing early would guarantee that strategic objectives are not met and, in all likelihood, force reintervention to deal with future security problems. Only a carefully designed and cautious counterinsurgency strategy can forestall this.
Accepting the exis
<a href="http://www.petermaass.com/core.cfm?p=1&mag=120&magtype=1" target="_blank">The Counterinsurgent</a>
A good article about the nature of the current insurgency in Iraq, from the viewpoint of Maj. John Nagl, West Point grad, PhD, counterinsurgency expert, professor at West Point, and now based near Falluja, in the "Sunni Triangle."
Article by Nagl referenced in previous article:
<a href="http://www.findarticles.com/cf_0/m2393/4_161/54146668/print.jhtml" target="_blank">Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife(1).(military policy)
World Affairs, Spring, 1999, by John A. Nagl
BRITISH AND AMERICAN ARMY COUNTERINSURGENCY LEARNING DURING THE MALAYAN EMERGENCY AND THE VIETNAM WAR</a>
<a href="http://www.twq.com/04winter/index.cfm?id=83" target="_blank">Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in Iraq - Steven Metz, director of research at the U.S. Army War College's Strategic Studies Institute.</a>
The intro:
[quote]An insurgency is born long before the government it seeks to overthrow knows of its existence. Rebels, guerrillas, and terrorists, far from prying eyes, gather in dark buildings, foreign sanctuaries, or-in today's day and age-online. At least initially, survival depends on cloaking intent and strength with ambiguity, deception, and subterfuge. Even after attacks begin in earnest, the intended targets tend to underestimate the problem, believ-ing it to be controllable, unorganized, and isolated rather than a symptom of a deeper pathology.
Understanding the factors leading to such a miscalculation is easy. Gone are the Cold War days when regimes could rely on a superpower patron for increased support against a rebellion. Although the most benevolent and stable government may face isolated violence, an organized insurgency reveals deep flaws in rule or administration. Today, even an unsuccessful insurrection can weaken or undercut a government, hinder economic development and access to global capital, or at least force national leaders to alter key policies. The tendency then is to deny or underestimate the threat, to believe that killing or capturing only a few of the most obvious rebel leaders will solve the problem when in fact the problem-the heart of the insurgency- lies deeper.
Like cancers, insurgencies are seldom accorded the seriousness they deserve at precisely the time they are most vulnerable, early in their development. Such is the situation that the United States and coalition forces face in Iraq today. Although U.S. strategists and political leaders may disagree about who is behind the violence in Iraq, the preconditions for a serious and sustained insurgency clearly exist.
The stakes in Iraq are immense. The conflict there will help determine whether the world continues its difficult and uneven movement toward a global system based on open governments and economies or fractures into a new bipolarity. The Arab world is the region most resistant to the U.S. vision of open economies and governments. If it can work there, it can work anywhere. Iraq is the beachhead, the test case, the laboratory.
Given these stakes and the price already paid, the United States must continue to pursue its strategic objective in Iraq but must do so in a way that limits the long-term damage to the United States itself and to the fragile, new Iraqi society. Calls for a speedy U.S. withdrawal will increase as the conflict drags on. Even Ambassador Paul Bremer, head of the Coalition Provisional Authority, has hinted that the United States may leave Iraq by the summer of 2004. Leaving too soon, however, would be disastrous. After all, Osama bin Laden's rise was in part a result of abandoning Afghanistan too soon after foreign occupation in 1979. Departing early would guarantee that strategic objectives are not met and, in all likelihood, force reintervention to deal with future security problems. Only a carefully designed and cautious counterinsurgency strategy can forestall this.
Accepting the exis